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DOMESTIC RELATIONS - DIVORCE AND SEPARATION -
TERM MINOR CHILD IN MARYLAND PROPERTY DISPOSI-
TION STATUTE DOES NOT INCLUDE STEPCHILD FOR
AWARD OF USE AND POSSESSION OF THE FAMILY HOME.
Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982).
After four years of marriage, a wife sued her husband for divorce a
mensa et thoro, certain personal property, and use and possession of the
family home.' No children had been born of the marriage, but the wife
was the custodial parent of two minor children from a previous mar-
riage. The chancellor's order awarded use and possession of the family
home2 to the wife and stepchildren,3 and required the husband to pay
one-half of the first and second mortgages and real estate taxes on the
home, pendente lite. From this interlocutory order, the husband ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to
consideration by the court of special appeals, and reversed and re-
manded the order.
The narrow issue addressed by the court of appeals centered on
the scope of the 1978 Maryland Property Disposition Statute's provi-
sion authorizing use and possession of the family home.4 The Property
Disposition Statute is governed throughout by concepts of equitable
distribution of property upon divorce.5 Prior to 1979, Maryland courts
were limited to distributing property according to title, and awarding
alimony and child support according to common law principles of
fault, need, and ability to pay.6 Equitable distribution, by contrast,
considers both spouses' contributions to the marriage.7 The chancellor
is required to use alimony and a monetary award to adjust the equities
and rights of the parties to marital property when formulating a fair
1. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 185, 448 A.2d 353, 354 (1982). Divorce a mensa
et thoro is a judicial decree which terminates the obligation and right of cohabita-
tion, without affecting the status of the parties as married persons. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 431 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). A final judgment of absolute divorce,
divorce a vinculo matrimoni, dissolves the marriage bond. Id
2. The husband argued that since he had owned the home prior to his second mar-
riage, it was not a "family home" within the meaning of the Property Disposition
Statute, which excludes property acquired prior to the marriage from the use and
possession provisions. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-01(b) (1980).
However, the court held that since the husband had created a tenancy by the
entirety after the marriage, the property was the family home for purposes of use
and possession upon divorce. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 186-87, 488 A.2d
353, 355 (1982).
3. In Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 275 n.1, 412 A.2d 396, 397 n.l (1980), the court
noted that technically the step relationship terminates upon divorce and thereafter
"stepfather" or "stepchild" is used for convenience but does not describe any legal
status. The distinction applies here.
4. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A (1980).
5. See the extended discussion in Note, Property Disposition Upon Divorce in Mary-
land- An Analysis of the New Statute, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 377 (1979).
6. Timanus v. Timanus, 178 Md. 640, 642-43, 16 A.2d 918, 920 (1940).
7. Bender v. Bender, 282 Md. 525, 534-35 n.7, 386 A.2d 772, 778 n.7 (1978); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05(b)(l) (1980).
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decree,8 and to give the interests of minor children "particular and
favorable attention."9
The use and possession order is one specific means by which the
legislative directive to consider these equities may be implemented by
the chancellor. When a spouse with custody of a minor child demon-
strates a need to live in a familiar environment, use and possession of
the family home for up to three years, in addition to any pendente lite
period, may be awarded.10 In Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, " such an
award was upheld against challenges on procedural due process
grounds and as an unconstitutional taking of property. In Pitsenberger,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland emphasized the legitimacy of the
order's purpose in protecting children's interests, and held that the
award fulfilled the father's obligation to provide shelter for his five mi-
nor children. '2
In the Property Disposition Statute, the relationship between the
minor child and the divorcing spouses is not explicitly addressed. In a
1981 case in the court of special appeals, Strawhorn v. Strawhorn, 1" the
husband argued that the only minor involved, a stepchild, was not in-
cluded in the legislation for purposes of awarding the use and posses-
sion of the family home.14 On its own initiative, the court of special
appeals compared the language of the proposed bill of the Property
Disposition Statute with its final enactment. 5 Finding that the original
phrase "children of the parties" had been deleted and the word "child"
substituted, 6 the court concluded that custody of a minor stepchild
would support a use and possession award.'7
8. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05(b)(8) (1980) (property disposition);
see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § l(b)(1)(ii)(1981) (award of alimony). These
statutes expressly cross-reference each other. Different principles apply to ali-
mony and child support, so they are usually awarded separately or the amounts
for each, within a lump sum, are specified. Donigan v. Donigan, 208 Md. 511,
521, 119 A.2d 430, 434 (1956); Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 524, 154 A. 95,
100 (1931). Maryland's child support statute does not refer to alimony or property
disposition. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602 (Supp. 1981).
9. Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304-05 (preamble to Property Dis-
position Statute).
10. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-06 (1980).
11. 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980).
12. Id at 32-34, 410 A.2d at 1059-60.
13. 49 Md. App. 649, 435 A.2d 466 (1981), vacated in part, 294 Md. 322, 450 A.2d 490
(1982).
14. Id at 651, 435 A.2d at 468.
15. See Blumenthal v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 278 Md. 398, 404-05, 365 A.2d 279, 283
(1976) (all legislative sources of information expressly approved for judicial use).
For judicial use of more extensive legislative history, see, e.g., Brown v. Brown,
287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980); Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. v. State Dep't of
Assessments & Taxation, 252 Md. 173, 249 A.2d 180 (1969); Barrett v. Charlson,
18 Md. App. 80, 305 A.2d 166 (1973).
16. See Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304-05 (preamble to Property
Disposition Statute).
17. Strawhorn v. Strawhorn, 49 Md. App. 649, 435 A.2d 466 (1981), vacated in part,
294 Md. 322, 450 A.2d 490 (1982). This conclusion was made in Note, Property
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Although Strawhorn was not cited by name, the court of appeals in
Bledsoe v. Bledsoe"s rejected its statutory interpretation.' 9 The lan-
guage at issue in the Property Disposition Statute is not precisely tai-
lored to express legislative intent to include stepchildren. Rather, the
language varies within and between sections,2" and does not mention
stepchildren.2 1 Both the court of special appeals and the court of ap-
peals agreed that this doubtful or ambiguous language requires the
court to look behind the face of the statute, 2 pursuant to its duty to
effectuate legislative intent.23 In Bledsoe, the statute as enacted was
compared with the comments of the Governor's Commission on Do-
mestic Relations Law accompanying the proposed bill. Since the legis-
lature made custody of a minor child a prerequisite for award of use
and possession, and omitted the alternate grounds proposed by the
Governor's Commission (that of a spouse with his or her own need to
live in the family home)24 the court concluded that the property depri-
Disposition Upon Divorce in Maryland: An Analysis of the New Statute, 8 U. BALT.
L. REV. 377, 388 n.75 (1979), cited by the court. Although the appellee in
Strawhorn cited this article in his brief, he did not cite it for the discussion of
whether stepchildren were contemplated by the legislature or the effect of the en-
acted language. Rather, it was cited as support for the claim that the use and
possession order is not child support. Brief for Appellee at 19, Strawhorn v.
Strawhorn, 49 Md. App. 649, 435 A.2d 466 (1981), vacated in part, 294 Md. 322,
450 A.2d 490 (1982).
18. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982).
19. Id at 192, 448 A.2d at 357-58.
20. The preamble speaks of "both spouses and any children they may have," and
"minor children in the family." Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws
2304-05. However, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-06 (1980) reads
simply, "a minor child." This is characteristic of the vague and varied language
in equitable distribution statutes. For example, Delaware's alimony statute refers
to "a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custo-
dian not be required to seek employment outside the home." DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1512(b)(3) (1981) (open to broad interpretation, including a stepchild).
However, authorization for use and possession of the family home is limited to
"the party with whom any children of the marriage will live." Id § 1513(a)(8)
(would not include a stepchild); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1981-
82); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236Bl.e., 5.d.(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 102(a)(2)(4), 501(b)(7) (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1982); UNI-
FORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, §§ 102, 303, 307B, 309 (1973).
21. The definition subsection of the Property Disposition Statute does, however, ex-
pressly enlarge the phrase "minor child" to include a dependent handicapped
child over the age of 18. Clearly, some legislative consideration was given to cate-
gories of children that would support the use and possession order. See MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-01(d) (1980).
22. See State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975) (only where
doubt or ambiguity exists in statutory language may the court look to the purposes
and objectives of the enactment), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976).
23. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 189, 448 A.2d 353, 356-57 (1982); Strawhorn v.
Strawhorn, 49 Md. App. 649, 655, 435 A.2d 466, 470 (1981), vacated in part, 294
Md. 322, 450 A.2d 490 (1982). For the intricate and multitudinous rules of statu-
tory construction which courts have developed, see generaly, 73 AM. JUR. 2d Stat-
utes §§ 142-341 (1974).
24. This disposes of the argument which, though not directly addressed by the court
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vation must be justified by obligation to the minor child.25 The change
from "children of the parties" to "minor child" was not decisive, as the
Strawhorn court held, but mere editing.26
The result in Bledsoe is consistent with prior Maryland decisions
which limit the word "child" to its ordinary meaning unlss expressly
expanded.27 In Flores v. King,28 the court of special appeals found that
a stepchild is not included in the language "a minor child" as used in
the state's wrongful-death statute.29 The question of whether the term
"child" included stepchild in a Maryland constitutional provision3 0 was
addressed by the court of appeals in Brown v. Brown, which involved
imprisonment for breach of a contractual agreement to support a de-
pendent stepchild. In Brown, the court held that the phrase "dependent
child" is limited to those children entitled to support by virtue of a legal
duty, apart from mere contractual obligation, and that stepchildren are
not included within the meaning of the provision.32
The Brown analysis was cited by the court of appeals as especially
relevant to the issues in Bledsoe.33 In the absence of legal and moral
parental obligations to the stepchild, the court found that a use and
possession award would inequitably burden the stepparent, since it
would depend on a tortured expansion of the term "child" as used in
the Property Disposition Statute. 4 For the duration of a marriage,
stepparents may be required by law to support stepchildren. 5 The
state's interest in requiring such support is the conservation of public
resources, and relieving the burden borne by taxpayers through welfare
programs.36 However, that duty terminates upon dissolution of the
of special appeals in Strawhorn, was put forth by the wife in that case: that the
order for use and possession runs to the spouse and so the spouse's need could
support the order. Brief for Appellee at 16-17, Strawhorn v. Strawhorn, 49 Md.
App. 649, 435 A.2d 466 (1981), vacated in part, 274 Md. 322, 450 A.2d 490 (1982).
A use and possession order could be justified as fulfillment of the obligation to
provide habitation, Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638, 643, 276 A.2d 425, 427
(1971), but only to the wife and only on the basis of demonstrated need for shelter,
not the familiar environment. Even if the wife's need for shelter is established,
that, in itself, would probably not justify use and possession of the family home
when other housing would be adequate and would not deprive the supporting
spouse of control of the property interest in the family home. Barcelow v.
Barcelow, 64 A.D.2d 1024, 409 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1978).
25. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 190-91, 448 A.2d 353, 357-58 (1982).
26. Id at 192, 448 A.2d at 358.
27. Id at 192-93, 448 A.2d at 358-59.
28. 13 Md. App. 270, 282 A.2d 521 (1971).
29. Id at 274-75, 282 A.2d at 523-24.
30. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 38.
31. 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980).
32. Id at 283-84, 412 A.2d at 402.
33. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 193, 448 A.2d 353, 358 (1982).
34. Id at 193-94, 448 A.2d at 359.
35. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 233.20e (1982); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 07.03.02.05(c)
(1982).
36. Komm v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 23 Wash. App. 593, 598, 597 P.2d
1372, 1374-75 (1979).
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marriage.37 Prior to Strawhorn, neither in Maryland nor in other juris-
dictions having comparable equitable distribution statutes has a sub-
stantial continuing obligation been made, in the form of a use and
possession order, when the only minor was a stepchild.38
The state unquestionably has a strong interest in the welfare of
minors. 39 When children are born of the marriage, the guidelines pro-
vided by the Maryland Property Disposition Statute appropriately bal-
ance the adult's economic, and the children's emotional, interests.40
But to continue the financial obligation4' of a stepparent after divorce
would be a drastic change,42 arguably unconstitutional,43 and certainly
37. See, e.g., Kaisor v. Kaisor, 93 Misc. 2d 36, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1978); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.16.205 (1974).
38. A substantial occupancy order, for five years, was awarded to the wife in a Ken-
tucky case, but the state's supreme court reduced this to a mere sixty days because
the only child involved was the husband's stepdaughter. In effect, the wife and
stepchild were not given use and possession, but only adequate time to make other
housing arrangements. McDowell v. McDowell, 378 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1964).
39. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 220 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting);
Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952). See general, 59 AM. JUR.
2d Parent and Child § 9 (1971).
40. Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 32, 410 A.2d 1052, 1058 (1980). For
example, regardless of the child's need to live in the familiar environment, after
the statutory limit of three years is over, the property is distributed either by title
or as marital property. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-06(e),(f)
(1980). In other jurisdictions lacking such a limit, the use and possession may be
extended while children live at home or until all minor children reach the age of
majority. See, e.g., Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So.2d 949 (Fla. 1980); Singer v.
Singer, 342 So.2d 861 (Fla. App. 1977); Biven v. Biven, 62 A.D.2d 1145, 404
N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978).
41. Arguably, in Bledsoe the payments for the mortgages and real estate taxes on the
house could be construed as contribution by the husband as a concurrent tenant,
thereby protecting his interest in the property, not as financial support of the
stepchildren. See Colburn v. Colburn, 265 Md. 468, 475-76, 290 A.2d 480, 484
(1972).
42. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 192, 448 A.2d 353, 358 (1982).
43. After Bledsoe, if the Property Disposition Statute is expressly amended to include
stepchildren in section 3-6A-03, the award of use and possession may be chal-
lenged on alternate constitutional grounds. One argument would seek to establish
such an award as an unconstitutional taking of property, Bureau of Mines v.
George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 157, 321 A.2d 748, 756 (1974)
(state constitutional provisions have same meaning as federal), either for public
benefit without compensation or for private use. See, e.g., Leet v. Montgomery
County, 264 Md. 606, 616, 287 A.2d 491, 497 (1972) (unconstitutional to compel
property owner to remove abandoned cars left by trespassers at his own expense);
Capital Transit Co. v. Bosley, 191 Md. 502, 514, 62 A.2d 267, 273 (1948) (uncon-
stitutional to compel bus company to charge fixed minimal rate for schoolchil-
dren); Perellis v. Mayor of Baltimore, 190 Md. 86, 93, 57 A.2d 341, 344-45 (1948)
(unconstitutional to close portion of public highway when primary purpose or
effect was private benefit).
A substantive due process and equal protection challenge, on the other hand,
would focus on whether the state's interest in the emotional welfare of minor chil-
dren is sufficiently compelling so that the stepparent's property deprivation is a
permissible exercise of legislative authority. See Bruce v. Director, Dep't of Ches-
apeake Bay Affairs, 261 Md. 585, 600-03, 276 A.2d 200, 208-09 (1971); Stevens v.
City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 564, 214 A.2d 775, 779 (1965); Ulman v. Mayor of
19821 Bkedsoe P. Bkedsoe
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inconsistent with a fair and equitable adjustment of the spouses' prop-
erty interests, when balanced by the lack of a parental relationship.44
In Bledsoe, the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarifies that such a
radical innovation is a legislative, not judicial, prerogative to make.
The courts may not, on their own initiative, move in the direction of
assimilating the status of the stepchild to the natural child.45 However,
the step relationship is increasingly common in contemporary society.
Its prevalence suggests that legislators would better serve both adults
and children by expressly addressing the scope of statutory schemes,
and setting forth those rights and obligations, if any, which are to flow
between stepparents and stepchildren.
Elizabeth 4. Hambrick-Stowe
Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 595-96, 20 A. 141, 142-43 (1890), af'd, 165 U.S. 719
(1897); Washington Statewide Org. of Stepparents v. Smith, 85 Wash. 2d 564, 572,
536 P.2d 1202, 1207 (1975) (Utter, J., concurring). A substantive economic due
process argument would fail, since there need only be a rational relation to a
legitimate state interest where ordinary social and economic legislation is con-
cerned. Governor v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 423-25, 370 A.2d 1102, 1111
(1977), ajfd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
44. Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 284, 412 A.2d 396, 401 (1980).
45. Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step" Relationshp: Cinderella Revisited, 4
FAM. L.Q. 209, 226-27 (1970).
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